When rhetoric and poetry were counted as logic: the Arabic Organon and al-Jāḥiẓ on eloquence
I keep a secondhand bookshop off Mutanabbi Street. People come in for poetry far more often than for logic, and they are surprised when I tell them that for centuries the two were shelved together.
In the Arabic tradition, following late-antique practice, Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics were counted as part of the logical corpus, the Organon. Al-Fārābī arranged the arts of argument by the kind of assent they produce: demonstration yields certainty; dialectic, rhetoric and poetry produce weaker or different kinds of assent, poetry working through imaginative evocation rather than belief. Ibn Rushd later wrote commentaries on both books.
Al-Jāḥiẓ comes from a different direction. His great book on eloquence, al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn, grows out of Arabic speech itself: sermons, proverbs, the speech of Bedouin and preachers. Bayān is clarity, making something manifest, and for him eloquence is a matter of fitting speech to listener and occasion.
What interests me is what follows from shelving rhetoric with logic. It suggests persuasion is not the enemy of reasoning but one of its forms, judged by its own standard. That is closer to Aristotle than to Plato's Gorgias. Does anyone know how this looked to readers at the time? And did it change how poetry was read?