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Reading group: Plato’s Gorgias in five weeks, one interlocutor at a time

Its coordinates: 4.2.3 Rhetoric

I teach theology at a secondary school in Thessaloniki, and every year a student asks whether politicians are "just good at talking". I always want to hand them the Gorgias, and I have never read it closely with adults. Let's do that.

Translation. Donald Zeyl's (Hackett, and in the Cooper Complete Works) or Robin Waterfield's (Oxford World's Classics). Stephanus numbers below so everyone can follow.

Plan.
– Week 1: 447a–461b. Socrates and Gorgias: what is rhetoric about, and what kind of persuasion does it produce?
– Week 2: 461b–466a. Polus takes over; the famous passage where rhetoric is called a form of flattery.
– Week 3: 466a–481b. Power, and the claim that doing injustice is worse than suffering it.
– Week 4: 481b–506c. Callicles, nature and convention, and the life of unlimited appetite.
– Week 5: 506c–527e. Socrates argues alone, and the closing myth of judgement.

What to watch for. The dialogue is itself a piece of persuasion about persuasion. Socrates complains about long speeches and then gives some. He mocks rhetoric and ends with a myth. Is Plato contradicting himself, or showing us what a rhetoric answerable to truth would look like? The Phaedrus, later, gives a friendlier answer; keep it in mind but leave it on the shelf for now.

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5 replies

  1. Giulia Ferrante

    Fellow

    Week 1. The key distinction for me is around 454e: Socrates gets Gorgias to agree there are two kinds of persuasion, one that produces belief without knowledge and one that produces knowledge. Rhetoric in the law courts, Gorgias admits, produces the first kind. Everything later depends on that concession. I'd love to know whether a real Gorgias would have made it; it seems the trap is closed at the moment he agrees.

    Helpful · 1
  2. Claire Dubois

    Fellow

    Week 2. The flattery passage turns on two words: technē, an art that can give an account of what it does and why, and empeiria, a knack picked up by experience. Socrates says rhetoric is not a technē because it cannot give the account. Then the proportion: rhetoric is to justice as cookery is to medicine, and as cosmetics are to gymnastics. Cookery gives pleasure and claims to know what is good for the body; medicine actually knows. Translating empeiria as "knack" (Zeyl) or "routine" makes a real difference to how contemptuous Socrates sounds.

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  3. Henrike Vogel

    Fellow

    Week 3. Polus laughs at the claim that doing injustice is worse than suffering it, and so did I the first time I read it as a young teacher. This time I noticed Socrates' method: he refuses to count votes. Polus can bring the whole city as witnesses; Socrates wants one witness only, the person he is talking to. It is a very Kantian moment, if I may say so in a Greek thread: the argument must convince this mind, not the crowd.

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  4. Javier Ferrandis

    Fellow

    Week 4. Callicles is the reason I joined. He says convention is the weak banding together to restrain the strong, and that by nature the stronger should have more. As an economist I hear Thrasymachus and a crude Hobbes at once. What's striking is that he isn't refuted so much as worn down. Socrates gets him to admit that some pleasures are better than others, and the position collapses. But Callicles never agrees; he just stops answering.

  5. Nikos Theodoridis

    Fellow

    Week 5. And so Socrates ends up taking both parts of the conversation himself, because Callicles refuses to continue. I find that an image of the whole problem: philosophy without an interlocutor becomes a monologue, which is exactly what Socrates accused rhetoric of being. Then the myth at the end, which is openly a story told to persuade. My conclusion: Plato does not reject persuasion. He rejects persuasion that does not care whether its hearer becomes better. Thank you all; this was the best five weeks I've spent with Plato since university.

    Helpful · 1