Nagarjuna’s tetralemma is not a rejection of logic
The catuṣkoṭi, or tetralemma, considers four options for any proposition: it is, it is not, both, neither. In the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Nāgārjuna often rejects all four. For example, the Buddha after death neither exists, nor doesn't exist, nor both, nor neither.
Some readers take this as a rejection of logic, a mystical leap beyond the law of non-contradiction. I think that's a misreading. Nāgārjuna argues rigorously; his targets are views that presuppose things have intrinsic nature (svabhāva). If the subject term is empty, all four predicates fail, just as all four options about "the present king of France is bald" fail.
Graham Priest and Jay Garfield have offered a different reading, using paraconsistent logic, where some contradictions are true. I find it fascinating but I'm not convinced it's needed. What do others think?