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Thesis Many-worlds is the most conservative reading of quantum mechanics, not the wildest

Where it stands

Many-worlds has a reputation as the science-fiction interpretation. I want to argue it is the opposite: the reading that adds least to the physics.

Look at what the others add. Copenhagen-style views add a collapse whenever a "measurement" happens, without saying what counts as one. Objective-collapse theories add new dynamics that the standard equations do not contain. Pilot-wave adds particles with definite positions on top of the wave, plus a guidance law. QBism reinterprets the wavefunction as belief, which changes what the theory is about.

Everett's 1957 proposal adds nothing. Take the Schrödinger equation, the one part of the theory everyone agrees on, and let it run, including on measuring devices and on us. What you get is a wavefunction that develops into many nearly independent branches, and decoherence explains why each branch looks classical from the inside. The "worlds" are not an extra postulate; they are what the equation already describes once you stop interrupting it.

Yes, the result has an enormous number of branches. But parsimony in science has usually meant fewer laws and fewer kinds of thing, not fewer instances. Nobody rejected astronomy because it multiplied galaxies.

I write software for a living, and I like theories whose code is short. Persuade me the code isn't short, or that short code is the wrong criterion.

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5 replies

For the thesis 1

  1. Emeka Nwosu

    For Fellow

    For, partly. When I teach decoherence, the branch structure stops looking exotic. Students see that a measuring device becoming correlated with a system is ordinary physics. What I never manage to make intuitive is Lars's question: why the weights matter if every branch is real.

    Helpful · 3

Against the thesis 3

  1. Lars Eriksen

    Against Fellow

    Against, and I'll go straight to the hardest point: probability. If every outcome of a measurement occurs, what does it mean for quantum mechanics to say one outcome has probability 0.9 and the other 0.1? Both happen. There have been ingenious attempts, notably decision-theoretic arguments that a rational agent who knows she will branch should weight branches by the Born rule. Many physicists are not persuaded that this is probability rather than something we have chosen to call probability. Short code that cannot explain its own most tested prediction is not short in the right way.

    Helpful · 1
  2. Abdulrahman Al-Qahtani

    Against Contributor

    Against the "most conservative" part. Bohm's theory also takes the wave equation unchanged; it adds particle positions so that there is one world in which things actually have locations. You call that an addition; I call it the minimum needed for the theory to be about objects at all. Every interpretation adds something. Yours adds an ontology so large that the question of what "I" will see becomes hard to state.

    Helpful · 2

Other replies

  1. Pieter de Jong

    Fellow

    I'll concede the probability problem is real, and that I was too quick. Revised thesis: many-worlds is the most conservative interpretation about dynamics, and pays for it in the metaphysics of probability and personal identity. Abdulrahman, I also take your point that "adding nothing" was rhetoric; every interpretation is making a choice about what the theory must be about. Mine is that the equation is about everything. I still find that the cleanest bet, but I would now call it a bet.

    1. Tomasz Wójcik

      Against Fellow

      A logician's aside on Pieter's revision: once "I" branch, sentences like "I will see spin up" lack a single determinate referent for "I" at the later time. You can treat that as a problem about indexicals rather than physics, but then the price of the theory is paid in philosophy of language. That is not a refutation. It is a bill.

      Helpful · 1