Thesis
Levinas’s face of the Other can ground human rights better than self-ownership can
Its coordinates: 6.4.2 Rights and Liberty
Where it stands
Most theories of rights begin with the self: I own myself, I have interests, I make claims. Levinas begins somewhere else. In Totality and Infinity (1961) and Otherwise than Being (1974), the face of the other person comes before any theory and makes a demand on me. In interviews he summed up its first word as: you shall not kill.
In the essay "The Rights of Man and the Rights of the Other", collected in Outside the Subject, Levinas suggests that human rights are first the rights of the other person, which I am responsible for, before they are mine to claim.
I translate philosophy for a living and have spent months with his French. My thesis: this is a better foundation for rights than self-ownership. It explains why rights bind those who have power, why they don't depend on the right-holder's ability to assert them, and why we feel their pull most strongly before the most vulnerable.
Thesis: Levinas's face of the Other can ground human rights better than self-ownership can.