Thesis Han Feizi was right that good government cannot wait for good rulers
Where it stands
I spend most of my time with the Mohists, but I read Han Feizi to understand why the Confucian picture of government lost so many arguments in the Warring States period, and I want to defend one of his central claims.
The Confucian ideal, put briefly, is government by the ruler's cultivated virtue and by ritual: the ruler sets the example and the people are transformed. Han Feizi's objection is simple. Sages are rare. A system that works only when a sage is on the throne will work once in a thousand years. What you need is a system that works with an average ruler, through fa: public, impersonal standards, applied through what he calls the two handles of punishment and reward, with officials held to account for whether their results match their words.
He mocks his opponents with the story of a farmer from Song who once saw a hare run into a tree stump and break its neck, and then gave up farming to wait by the stump for another. Those who want to govern by the ways of ancient kings, he says, are waiting by the stump.
My thesis is narrow: on this point he was right. Good government must be designed for ordinary rulers. That is why impersonal standards, published and applied regardless of who is in front of the official, matter more than the virtue of the person at the top.
I know the obvious objections: Qin's brutality, and that Han Feizi's fa binds the subjects and not the ruler. I want to hear them argued well.