Friedman’s billiard player: is predictive success really all a model owes us?
My models predict, quite well, who will repay a small loan, using patterns in phone and payment records. They do not describe why anyone repays. Some of the strongest predictors are things that have no plausible causal story at all.
A colleague told me that Milton Friedman defended exactly this kind of modelling in a famous 1953 essay, "The Methodology of Positive Economics". His example was an expert billiard player: you can predict his shots very well by assuming he calculates the optimal angles with complex mathematics, even though he does nothing of the sort. The assumption is false; the predictions are good; that, Friedman says, is all that matters.
It's a comforting argument for someone in my job. But I've seen models like mine fail suddenly when the world changes, and fail without any warning, because nobody knew what they were tracking.
Could someone explain Friedman's argument properly, and the main philosophical objections to it? I'd like to know whether I should feel comforted or worried.