On the Coordinates: 2.1 Theories of Knowledge · 2.6 Rationality · 6.8.1 Scientific Explanation +5 more related questions
Also known as Gilbert H. Harman
1938 – 2021 · East Orange (New Jersey); Princeton
Traditions: Analytic
In brief
Gilbert Harman (1938–2021) was an American philosopher who taught at Princeton University from 1963 until 2017. His 1965 paper ‘The Inference to the Best Explanation’ described and defended, under that name, a pattern of reasoning in which we accept the hypothesis that best explains the evidence; he treated ordinary induction as a special case of it. In ethics he argued that moral facts are not needed to explain what we observe, and he defended a form of moral relativism based on implicit agreements. In Change in View (1986) he argued that principles of reasoning are principles for revising beliefs and intentions, not principles of logic. He later used social psychology to question whether people have the character traits that virtue ethics assumes. He worked across language, mind, epistemology and ethics, and helped connect philosophy with cognitive science.
In depth Last reviewed
Connections
- Places
- Princeton died, taught
- Tradition
- Analytic
- Influences
- 3 sourced relationships
Life
Gilbert Helms Harman was born on 26 May 1938 in East Orange, New Jersey (Town Topics obituary), and grew up outside Philadelphia (Princeton University obituary). He graduated from Swarthmore College in 1960 and took his PhD at Harvard in 1964 with a dissertation supervised by W. V. O. Quine.
He was hired by Princeton to begin teaching in 1963. The Town Topics obituary gives his promotions: assistant professor in 1964, associate professor in 1969 and full professor in 1972. He retired in 2017 as James S. McDonnell Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy, after about 54 years on the faculty. With George Miller he co-directed the Princeton Cognitive Science Laboratory from 1985 to 1995, and he chaired the Program in Cognitive Studies from 1991 to 1998. He supervised about one in seven of the graduate students who completed philosophy dissertations at Princeton in that time; the University obituary names Joshua Knobe, James Dreier and Angela Mendelovici among them. The department marked his 50 years of teaching with a conference in 2013.
He received the Jean Nicod Prize in 2005 and the Howard T. Behrman Award for Distinguished Achievement in the Humanities in 2009. He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (2005, according to Town Topics) and was a fellow of the Cognitive Science Society and the Association for Psychological Science. He died at his home in Princeton on 13 November 2021, aged 83.
Problems
- When is it reasonable to accept a hypothesis because it explains the evidence?
- Is logic a theory of how we should reason, or something else?
- Do moral facts explain anything we observe?
- Is there a single true morality, or is moral rightness relative to agreements or frameworks?
- Do people have the stable character traits that virtue ethics assumes?
- When we attend to a perceptual experience, do we find anything besides features of the things perceived?
Core ideas
Inference to the best explanation
In ‘The Inference to the Best Explanation’ (Philosophical Review, 1965) Harman described a form of reasoning in which one accepts a hypothesis because it would explain the evidence better than its rivals. Seeing footprints in the sand, we infer that someone walked there, because that best explains them. The SEP’s entry on abduction notes that abduction in the modern sense is often called inference to the best explanation, and that Harman conceives induction as a special type of abduction. The same entry cites his 1965 paper among defences of the view that trust in testimony rests on abductive reasoning, and his Thought (1973) among replies to Cartesian scepticism. A standard question for any such view is what makes one explanation better than another, and why the better explanation should be more likely to be true.
Reasoning is change in view, not logic
Change in View (1986) separates reasoning from logic. According to the book’s abstract, its central idea is to identify principles of reasoning with principles for revising one’s beliefs and intentions, rather than with principles of logic. Logic says which conclusions follow from which premises. It does not say what to believe: if I believe some premises and see that they imply a conclusion I reject, I may give up a premise instead of accepting the conclusion. Reasoning in this sense is a change in a whole set of beliefs and plans, and it can be practical (about intentions) as well as theoretical. The abstract notes consequences for psychology, artificial intelligence, epistemology, ethics and the theory of action.
Moral facts and explanation
In The Nature of Morality (1977) Harman put an explanatory challenge to moral realism. In science, observations give evidence for theories because the facts the theories describe help explain the observations. The SEP’s ‘Moral Realism’ entry reports the argument, which it pairs with Mackie’s, that moral facts play no such role: our moral judgements can be explained by our upbringing and psychology without supposing that anything is really right or wrong. If so, observation gives no evidence for moral facts. Nicholas Sturgeon (1985) replied that moral facts do figure in good explanations, as when a person’s depravity is cited to explain what he did (SEP).
Moral relativism based on agreement
In ‘Moral Relativism Defended’ (1975) Harman argued for a relativism about what he called inner moral judgements, such as the judgement that a person ought to do something. The SEP’s ‘Moral Relativism’ entry summarises the argument: such a judgement implies that the person has reasons to act, and a person is likely to have such reasons only if he or she has implicitly entered into an agreement with others. An action may then be right relative to one agreement and wrong relative to another. The SEP notes that Harman presents his relativism as a thesis about logical form, and lists him with Prinz and Wong among those who stress the importance of moral disagreement. Later papers include ‘Is There a Single True Morality?’ (1984) and ‘Moral Relativism is Moral Realism’ (2015).
The situationist challenge to virtue ethics
In ‘Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology’ (1999) Harman drew on experiments in social psychology in which small features of a situation predicted behaviour better than measures of character. The SEP’s ‘Empirical Approaches to Moral Character’ credits Harman, with John Doris, with starting the situationist challenge in philosophy. The argument has two stages: the studies suggest that people lack broad, ‘global’ character traits, and Aristotelian virtue ethics presupposes such traits. Harman suggested that there may be no such thing as character in this sense, while, the SEP notes, he seems open to people having narrow, local traits. A sequel, ‘The Nonexistence of Character Traits’, followed in 2000.
Transparency of experience
In ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’ (1990) Harman defended a representational theory of sensory qualities. The SEP’s ‘Representational Theories of Consciousness’ entry reports his transparency argument: look at a tree and try to attend to the intrinsic features of your visual experience, and you will find only features of the tree. The qualities we notice in perception are presented as qualities of the objects perceived. Harman therefore denied that experiences have introspectible ‘mental paint’, intrinsic features of the representation itself. The SEP discusses Ned Block alongside him on the question of mental paint.
Works
- ‘The Inference to the Best Explanation’, Philosophical Review 74: 88–95 1965Short paper that described and defended inference to the best explanation (SEP, ‘Abduction’).
- Thought 1973Princeton University Press. A book on knowledge, reasoning and the mind; the Princeton University obituary calls it a classic of epistemology.
- ‘Moral Relativism Defended’, Philosophical Review 84: 3–22 1975His agreement-based relativism about inner moral judgements; reprinted in Explaining Value (SEP).
- The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics 1977Oxford University Press. Contains the explanatory challenge to moral realism (SEP, ‘Moral Realism’). Title and subtitle as in the WorldCat record.
- Change in View: Principles of Reasoning 1986MIT Press (A Bradford Book). Reasoning as the revision of beliefs and intentions.
- ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’ 1990In J. E. Tomberlin (ed.), Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind (Philosophical Perspectives 4, Ridgeview); the transparency argument (SEP, ‘Representational Theories of Consciousness’).
- ‘Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99: 315–331 1999The situationist challenge to virtue ethics (SEP, ‘Empirical Approaches to Moral Character’).
- Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy 2000Clarendon Press. Collects his papers in ethics, including ‘Moral Relativism Defended’ and ‘Is There a Single True Morality?’ (SEP, ‘Moral Relativism’).
- Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (with Judith Jarvis Thomson)A debate book: Harman defends relativism, Thomson objectivity. Listed in the Princeton University obituary; year not confirmed in an opened source.
- Reasoning, Meaning, and MindCollected essays, listed in the Princeton University obituary; year not confirmed.
- Reliable Reasoning: Induction and Statistical Learning Theory (with Sanjeev Kulkarni)On induction and machine learning; listed in the Princeton University obituary with a companion volume, An Elementary Introduction to Statistical Learning Theory. Years not confirmed.
- Semantics of Natural Language (co-edited with Donald Davidson)Edited volume listed in the Princeton University obituary; year not confirmed.
Influences and relationships
3 sourced relationships. Open one to read why, and the source.
Shaped or answered Gilbert Harman 2
Influenced byW. V. O. Quine1908 – 2000
Quine supervised Harman’s Harvard dissertation, completed in 1964.
Source: princeton.edu · stated on the profile of Gilbert Harman
Criticised byNicholas Sturgeonno profile yet
Sturgeon (1985) replied to Harman’s explanatory argument, holding that moral facts do figure in good explanations of events and behaviour.
Source: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy · stated on the profile of Gilbert Harman
Gilbert Harman shaped 1
InfluencedJoshua Knobeno profile yet
Knobe completed his Princeton PhD in 2006 and is named in the University obituary among Harman’s students.
Source: princeton.edu · stated on the profile of Gilbert Harman
Reception
Harman’s 1965 paper is a standard reference in work on abduction: the SEP’s entry cites it on the relation between induction and abduction and on testimony, and cites Thought (1973) among responses to Cartesian scepticism. His explanatory argument in The Nature of Morality is one of the main challenges discussed in the SEP’s ‘Moral Realism’ entry, alongside Mackie, with Sturgeon’s reply among the responses. The SEP’s ‘Moral Relativism’ entry lists him among contemporary defenders of relativism and discusses his agreement-based argument in detail. His 1999 and 2000 papers, with Doris’s work, set off the philosophical debate on situationism and character described in the SEP. The SEP lists him among early defenders of the representational theory of sensory qualities, and his transparency argument was extended by Tye and Crane to bodily sensations. The Princeton obituary quotes his colleague Gideon Rosen describing him as a maverick rather than a system-builder who often revised his views in the light of linguistics and cognitive science.
Disputed interpretations
Do moral facts explain anything?
Harman (1977), with Mackie, argued that our moral beliefs can be explained without appeal to moral facts, so observation gives no evidence for them. Sturgeon (1985) and others reply that moral facts do figure in explanations, and the SEP notes a further reply: anyone who thinks their moral beliefs justified must think them sensitive in part to moral facts (SEP, ‘Moral Realism’).
Relativism as a thesis about logical form
Harman held that inner moral judgements are relative to agreements, and later argued that such relativism is compatible with a kind of moral realism (‘Moral Relativism is Moral Realism’, 2015). His debate with Judith Jarvis Thomson set relativism against objectivity.
Are there character traits?
Harman suggested, on the basis of social psychology, that there may be no global character traits, which would undercut Aristotelian virtue ethics. The SEP’s ‘Empirical Approaches to Moral Character’ notes that he seems open to people having narrow, local traits, which leaves room for debate about what the experiments show.
Mental paint
Harman explicitly denied that experience has introspectible intrinsic features beyond what it represents. The SEP’s ‘Representational Theories of Consciousness’ discusses him with Ned Block on whether such ‘mental paint’ exists.
Primary texts
- Change in View: Principles of Reasoning (MIT Press, 1986) Free to read · dc2.philarchive.orgPhilArchive record with the publisher’s abstract; whether a free full text is available there was not checked.
- ‘The Inference to the Best Explanation’, Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 88–95Journal article; no free legal full text was checked.
- The Nature of Morality (Oxford University Press, 1977) and Explaining Value (Clarendon Press, 2000)In copyright; no free legal full text checked.
Sources
- Princeton University: Gilbert Harman, philosopher who built bridges to cognitive science, dies at 83 (2021) princeton.edu
- Princeton Town Topics obituary: Gilbert Helms Harman (via harmania.princeton.edu) harmania.princeton.edu
- SEP: Abduction (Igor Douven) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- SEP: Moral Relativism (Chris Gowans) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- SEP: Moral Realism (Geoff Sayre-McCord) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- SEP: Empirical Approaches to Moral Character (Christian B. Miller) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- SEP: Representational Theories of Consciousness (William Lycan) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- PhilArchive: Gilbert Harman, Change in View: Principles of Reasoning (MIT Press, 1986), record and abstract dc2.philarchive.org
- WorldCat: The nature of morality: an introduction to ethics (Oxford University Press, 1977), OCLC 2725781 search.worldcat.org
- PhilPapers: Gilbert Harman, ‘Moral Relativism Defended’, Philosophical Review 84 (1) (1975): 3–22 philpapers.org
Scholarly sources and reference works, free to read online.
Related questions
- 2.1 Theories of KnowledgeWhat has to be added to a true belief to make it knowledge?
- 2.6 RationalityIs it rational to believe what the evidence supports, or what serves you?
- 6.8.1 Scientific ExplanationWhen have you explained something, rather than just described it?
- 3.1.1 Moral Realism vs Anti-RealismIf everyone approved of torturing children, would it still be wrong?
- 3.1.3 Moral EpistemologyHow would you check whether a moral claim is true?
- 3.2.3 Character-Based ApproachesShould ethics ask what to do, or who to be?
- 3.4 Moral PsychologyAre people naturally good, naturally selfish, or naturally neither?
- 1.3.4 Qualia and the Hard ProblemWhy isn't it all dark inside?
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Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 30 October 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
APA (7th edition)
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BibTeX
@misc{cot-gilbert-harman-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Gilbert Harman},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/thinker/gilbert-harman/},
note = {Source-checked 30 October 2026}
}RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Gilbert Harman T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/10/30 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/thinker/gilbert-harman/ LA - en ER -
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