Do I see that an old woman is being humiliated, or do I infer it? Moral perception on a night shift
Its coordinates: 3.1 Meta-Ethics · 3.1.1 Moral Realism vs Anti-Realism · 3.1.2 Moral Semantics +1 more
Last month, when I went with one of our residents to the hospital, a senior doctor spoke to her as if she were not there, discussing her bowels with a junior doctor across her bed. I did not reason my way to the thought that this was humiliating for her. I saw it, the way I see that someone is cold. Her face told me, and her hands on the sheet.
The junior doctor, a perfectly decent young man, saw nothing. When I raised it afterwards he was genuinely surprised.
This made me think about whether moral knowledge works like perception. Some philosophers apparently say it does: that we perceive cruelty or humiliation directly, the way we perceive colour, and that ethical training is partly training in what to notice. Iris Murdoch's The Sovereignty of Good (1970) has an example I keep returning to: a mother-in-law who thinks her son's wife vulgar and tiresome, and who, by looking again, justly and lovingly, comes to see her as fresh and spontaneous. Murdoch's point is that this change of vision is moral work, even though the mother-in-law does nothing outwardly.
Two questions for the forum:
- If moral features can be perceived, why did the junior doctor not see what I saw? Is that a failure of vision, or of training, or of character?
- Can perception mislead in ethics the way it does with optical illusions? I have certainly “seen” rudeness that turned out to be exhaustion.