Twenty-odd species concepts, and conservation law written as if there were one
Its coordinates: 6.12 Philosophy of Biology
This year a survey of one of the lakes our trust looks after turned up two populations that look almost identical, interbreed where they meet, but differ genetically and in when they spawn. Are they one species or two? The answer is not academic. Our protection schedules, like most conservation law, are written as lists of species.
The textbook answer is Ernst Mayr's biological species concept: a species is a group of populations that actually or potentially interbreed and are reproductively isolated from others. It works for many animals. It fails outright for bacteria and for asexual lineages, and it cannot be applied to fossils at all. So biologists use other concepts as well: lineages with a shared history, groups that can be diagnosed by fixed characters, ecological niches, and so on. Depending on how you count, more than twenty are in use.
Two readings of this situation:
- The defect reading: "species" is a confused concept, and the plurality shows biology has not yet found what it is tracking.
- The diversity reading: there are really several kinds of biological grouping, and life simply does not divide itself in one way.
I lean towards the second. But if that is right, a law that protects "species" is choosing one grouping among several, often without saying so, and that choice decides which of my two fish populations gets protected. Is there a principled way to make it?