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Thesis The al-Ghazali–Hume parallel is shallower than the textbooks suggest

Kenneth Leung Chi-ho Fellow
· 5 replies · 254 views
CausationIslamicModern EuropeanAsh'arismEmpiricismAl-GhazaliDavid Hume#comparative-philosophy#false-agreement#necessary-connection#occasionalism
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Where it stands

I teach comparative philosophy, and the sentence I most often have to correct in student essays is "al-Ghazālī anticipated Hume". I'd like to argue that the parallel, though real, is shallower than it is usually made to look.

The shared step is this: we observe one event accompanying another, never a necessity that links them. Beyond that the two diverge on at least three points.

  1. The question. Hume asks where our idea of necessary connection comes from, and answers that it comes from a feeling of expectation produced by custom. His problem is about the origin of an idea. Al-Ghazālī asks whether the philosophers can demonstrate that the effect necessarily follows from the cause, and argues that they cannot, because the cause without the effect involves no contradiction.
  2. The conclusion about necessity. Al-Ghazālī does not deny that there is a necessity governing events. He locates it in God's will. Hume denies that we have any idea of necessity beyond the felt expectation.
  3. The purpose. One makes room for divine agency and miracles. The other makes our confidence in causation a habit of mind with no rational foundation.

Calling al-Ghazālī a forerunner of Hume makes him a stage on the road to European empiricism, which is a strange compliment to pay a man who would have thought Hume's conclusion a disaster. My thesis: the arguments share a step, and the philosophies share almost nothing.

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5 replies

For the thesis 2

  1. Layla Haddad

    For Fellow

    I agree with Kenneth about the conclusions, and I'd add a complication that makes the parallel even thinner: whether al-Ghazālī was an occasionalist at all is disputed. The textbook picture pairs "Hume the sceptic" with "al-Ghazālī the occasionalist". If the second half is uncertain, the comparison rests on less than it seems.

  2. Mona Fathy

    For Contributor

    The word "anticipated" does a lot of damage in my field. Every catalogue of manuscripts I've worked with has someone who "anticipated" a European. It makes the European the measure, and the earlier thinker interesting only as a forerunner. Kenneth's point about the strange compliment is exactly right.

    Helpful · 1

Against the thesis 2

  1. Abdulrahman Al-Qahtani

    Against Contributor

    I'd push back on your first point. Hume also argues from conceivability. In the Enquiry, he says that the contrary of every matter of fact is still possible, because it implies no contradiction. That is exactly al-Ghazālī's move: the fire without the burning involves no contradiction, so the connection is not logically necessary. So the two don't only share the observation. They share the modal argument too. That's more than one step.

    Helpful · 3
  2. Tomasz Wójcik

    Against Fellow

    As a logician I'll side with Abdulrahman on one thing. Validity doesn't care about purpose. If both argue "the effect's not following involves no contradiction, so the connection is not logically necessary", that's the same argument, whatever each wanted it for. You can say the philosophies differ. But you can't say the parallel is shallow at the level of argument. It's exact.

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Other replies

  1. Kenneth Leung Chi-ho

    Fellow

    I accept the correction from Abdulrahman and Tomasz. The parallel isn't one step. It's the observation plus the conceivability argument, and at that level it's close to exact. So, revised: the arguments are deeply parallel and the philosophies are not. What's shallow is the story that one prefigures the other. That is the claim I'll keep correcting in essays, and I'll stop saying the parallel itself is shallow.

    Helpful · 3