Thesis Testimony is an independent source of knowledge, not reducible to perception or inference
Where it stands
The Nyāya school counts testimony (śabda) as a distinct means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa), alongside perception, inference and comparison. The Vaiśeṣikas and Buddhist epistemologists like Dignāga disagreed, reducing testimony to a form of inference: I infer the truth of what you say from your reliability.
The same debate exists in Western philosophy. Hume, in his essay on miracles, treats our trust in testimony as based on experience of its reliability. Thomas Reid argued we have a natural disposition to trust others, which is a basic source of knowledge. C. A. J. Coady's Testimony (1992) argued that Hume's reductionism fails, because we couldn't possibly check the reliability of most of what we've been told.
My thesis: testimony is an independent source of knowledge, as Nyāya and Reid held.