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Thesis Robert Adams’s modified divine command theory answers the ‘God could command cruelty’ objection

Aoife Brennan Fellow
· 5 replies · 143 views
God & the argumentsAnalyticJewishMedieval ChristianNatural lawScholasticismRobert AdamsWilliam of Ockham#arbitrariness#divine-command-theory#robert-adams#voluntarism
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Where it stands

The standing objection to divine command theory is that if obligation depends on God's will as such, the content of morality could in principle have been anything. Had God commanded gratuitous cruelty, cruelty would have been obligatory. William of Ockham is often cited for accepting a version of this, though scholars argue about how far he went.

Robert Adams's modified theory, which I've been studying for a seminar, seems to me to answer it. Two moves:

  1. Goodness is not grounded in command. For Adams, the Good just is God, and finite things are good by resembling God in some way. So the standard of value is God's nature, not God's decisions.
  2. Obligation is grounded in command, but the commands of a loving, just God. Wrongness is contrariety to the commands of that God. A command of gratuitous cruelty is not something such a God would issue, so the theory doesn't say cruelty would then be obligatory. The hypothetical describes a different being.

This keeps what seems right about the command view (obligation is social, it's owed to someone, it can be violated) while blocking arbitrariness. I'm Catholic and my instincts run toward natural law, but I find this genuinely strong.

Objections welcome, especially from anyone who thinks the arbitrariness has simply been moved rather than removed.

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5 replies

For the thesis 2

  1. Fr. Ikechukwu Anyanwu

    For Fellow

    For, with a natural-law friend's caveat. Adams's first move is close to the classical view that God is goodness itself, which Aquinas would recognise. That part blocks arbitrariness well. The second move, grounding obligation in command, is where natural lawyers part company: for Aquinas, much of morality is legible in created nature by reason, and the commands of revelation confirm and complete it. So I'd say Adams succeeds, and also needs less command than he thinks.

    Helpful · 1
  2. Rabbi Eliana Gutman

    For Fellow

    For. In my tradition Abraham argues with God over Sodom: "Shall not the Judge of all the earth deal justly?" That question only makes sense if there's a standard of justice that God's acts can be measured against, and if God is expected to meet it. Adams gives the philosophical version: the commands come from a nature that is itself just. Abraham is not refuting God; he's appealing to God's own character.

    Helpful · 2

Against the thesis 2

  1. Arvind Poojary

    Against Fellow

    Against, and yes, I think it has been moved. Ask why God's nature is the standard of goodness. If the answer is "because God's nature is good", we're back in the Euthyphro, just one level up. If the answer is "because goodness simply is resemblance to God", then "God is good" says only "God resembles God", and the praise you wanted to give God has disappeared. Adams compares this to discovering that water is H₂O, but we identified water by its observable role first. What role identifies the Good independently, so that we could discover it is God?

  2. Tomasz Wójcik

    Against Fellow

    Against, on the logic. Adams's reply to the cruelty hypothetical says its antecedent is impossible, since a loving God couldn't command cruelty. Then the conditional "if God commanded cruelty, cruelty would be obligatory" is either vacuously true or ill-formed, depending on your theory of counterpossibles. Either way it doesn't settle much. The real question is whether the necessity of God's goodness is earned by argument or stipulated. If stipulated, Arvind's objection stands.

    Helpful · 3

Other replies

  1. Aoife Brennan

    Fellow

    I concede more to Arvind than I expected. "Why God's nature?" needs an answer that doesn't assume what it's trying to show, and I'm not sure Adams supplies one. Where I still think he's right is against the crude version of the objection: the theory doesn't make morality depend on arbitrary decrees. Ikechukwu's caveat is probably where I'll end up, natural law with Adams's account of obligation as a supplement.