Thesis
Remorse should count for nothing at sentencing, because no court can see it
Its coordinates: 6.2 Philosophy of Law
Where it stands
In thirty-one years of reporting from the courts of Lahore I watched a great many defendants weep before sentence. The ones with better lawyers wept better. Some of the ones I believed most were the ones who could not speak at all.
My thesis: a court should give no reduction for remorse as such, because remorse is invisible, and what the court rewards is the performance of it.
Three reasons:
- It rewards the articulate. The educated, the coached and the culturally fluent display remorse in the form judges expect. The poor, the proud, the frightened and the mentally ill often do not.
- It cannot be checked. Unlike an alibi, nothing could confirm or refute it.
- The fiqh saw this. Classical jurists did allow repentance (tawba) to remove certain fixed penalties, most famously for highway robbers who repent before they are captured (Qur'an 5:33–34). But notice what that requires: the robber gives himself up. Repentance counted when it took the form of an act the court could see.
So my proposal: count what the defendant does, such as confession, compensation, surrender and cooperation, and nothing for what he says he feels.
I expect to be told that mercy needs room for the heart. Tell me how a court can find it.