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Question of the day: is information something in the world, or something we bring to it?

Its coordinates: 6.18 Philosophy of Information

Today's question comes from the card on philosophy of information: is information something in the world, or something we bring to it?

A pine is felled at the edge of a forest. It has sixty rings. Before anyone counts them, did the rings already carry the information that the tree was sixty years old? Or were they only marks, waiting for someone who knew what to ask?

Some rival answers:

  • It is in the world. Information is a matter of reliable connection. Fred Dretske argued that a signal carries information about a source when it depends on that source in a lawful way, whether or not anyone reads it. The rings carried it all along. Some physicists go further: John Wheeler's slogan "it from bit" suggests that the physical world is, at bottom, made of information.
  • We bring it. Without a receiver who has questions and background knowledge, there is only structure. Even Claude Shannon's mathematical measure needs someone to fix the set of possible messages and their probabilities.
  • There are two things here. Correlation, which is in the world, and semantic information, which needs meaning. Luciano Floridi defines the second as well-formed, meaningful and truthful data.

It matters more than it sounds. Does DNA "contain instructions"? Does a model trained on your messages "contain" you?

The card sets out the positions: 6.18 Philosophy of Information.

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3 answers

  1. Derek Hollis

    Fellow

    Shannon was admirably clear about his side of this. In the opening of his 1948 paper he says the messages often have meaning, but that "these semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem." His theory measures how much choice a message represents among the possible messages, not what it says.

    But notice the hidden step: "the possible messages". The entropy of a source depends on the probability distribution you assign it, and someone has to pick that model. So even the most physical-looking information is relative to a description. That doesn't make it subjective. It makes it a relation between a system and a way of carving it.

  2. Meera Kulkarni

    Fellow

    The Nyāya account of inference has a structure very like this. From smoke on the hill one infers fire, and the ground of the inference, vyāpti, the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire, is a real relation in the world. Nobody invents it.

    But an inference only happens for a knower who has grasped that relation, by observing kitchens and fires, and who sees this smoke. The tradition even separates inference for oneself from inference for others, set out in five steps to persuade someone else.

    So: the concomitance is in the world; the information is for someone. I suspect Dretske and Floridi are describing the two halves of what the Naiyāyikas kept together.

  3. Ignacio Cárcamo

    Contributor

    Underwater I'd put it in a third place. A kelp holdfast grips harder when the swell builds. The swell doesn't "send" information, and nobody is reading it. But for the kelp, the change in pull makes a difference that matters to whether it survives the night.

    So information is neither in the world alone nor in a mind alone. It exists for a living system to which some differences make a difference. A tree ring is information for a forester, and also, in its way, was information for the tree.