Thesis Hountondji was right: a people’s worldview is not yet philosophy
Where it stands
Every year a student in my lycée class asks why we study Descartes and not ‘African philosophy’. I owe them a serious answer, and the most serious one I know is Paulin Hountondji's.
In African Philosophy: Myth and Reality (originally 1976), Hountondji attacked what he called ethnophilosophy: books like Placide Tempels's Bantu Philosophy, which reconstructed a collective, implicit ‘philosophy’ of a whole people from their language, proverbs and customs. Hountondji's objection was not that Africans lack philosophy. It was that a collective worldview, attributed to everyone and argued by no one, is anthropology. Philosophy needs named individuals whose arguments can be examined and rejected, a literature in which people disagree.
Thesis: Hountondji was right, and the real history of African philosophy is the history of African philosophers arguing, from Amo and the Ethiopian Hatata (whoever its author was) to Wiredu, Gyekye and Hountondji himself.
I know the objections. Ethnophilosophy was a response to the colonial claim that Africans had no thought at all. Oral traditions contain argument. Odera Oruka's sage philosophy found individual thinkers among people who never wrote. But I think each of these is a refinement of Hountondji's criterion, not a rejection of it.