Devadatta is fat but never eats by day: is Mīmāṃsā “postulation” just inference to the best explanation?
When I teach sources of knowledge comparatively, I like to point out that the European and Indian debates ask different questions. The European one asks which source does the real work, senses or reason. The Indian one asks how many irreducible sources there are, and argues about whether each can be derived from another. That second question turns up things the first barely notices, and my favourite is arthāpatti, usually translated "postulation" or "presumption".
The textbook case: Devadatta is fat, yet he never eats during the day. Therefore he eats at night. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, following Kumārila, counted this as a distinct means of knowledge, alongside perception, inference, comparison, testimony and non-apprehension. The Naiyāyikas, who counted four, said it was really a kind of inference. Dignāga's school, with only two, would agree with the Naiyāyikas on that point at least.
A reader trained in analytic philosophy shrugs: obviously this is inference to the best explanation, the thing detectives and scientists do every day. But I think the shrug is too quick. The mark of arthāpatti is that the conclusion is the only way to make two established facts consistent; the technical phrase means roughly "it could not be otherwise". Inference to the best explanation is comparative and probabilistic: of the available hypotheses, this one explains best. Those are not obviously the same operation.
So my questions: is postulation a species of inference, or something else? And does the Indian insistence on counting it separately reveal anything the European tradition missed, or did the Europeans simply file it under a broader heading?