Thesis Calling Wang Fuzhi a materialist hides more than it reveals
Its coordinates: 1.1 Ontology · 1.1.1 Substance Theory · 1.1.2 Universals and Particulars +2 more
Where it stands
Some older textbooks my students find online still call Wang Fuzhi (Chuanshan) a "materialist". The label comes mostly from twentieth-century scholarship that wanted ancestors for a materialist philosophy, and it has a respectable basis: Wang made qi the sole reality and treated li, principle or pattern, as the pattern of qi rather than a second kind of thing prior to it. That is a direct challenge to Zhu Xi, for whom li and qi are never found apart but li is in some sense prior.
My thesis is that "materialist" misleads more than it helps.
- "Materialism" belongs to a contrast between matter and mind. Qi is not on one side of that contrast. It is the stuff of rocks and of feelings, of bodies and of moral responses. Translators render it as vital force, material force or energy, and each rendering drops something.
- Wang's qi is patterned through and through. Calling him a materialist suggests a world of inert stuff pushed about by laws, which is the opposite of what he describes.
- His interest is moral and practical. He rejects the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness and any li floating free of concrete things because they lead people away from the actual world in which duties must be done.
So he denies the very distinction that "materialism" presupposes. I would rather call him a qi-monist and explain what qi is. Please tell me if I am being precious about a label that does useful work.