Bent when sitting, straight when standing: what is the problem of temporary intrinsics?
Its coordinates: 1.1 Ontology · 1.1.1 Substance Theory · 1.1.2 Universals and Particulars +2 more
I hit a passage in my weekend metaphysics reading I could not follow, about something David Lewis called the problem of temporary intrinsics.
The example: I am bent when I sit and straight when I stand. Both are true of me. But bent and straight are incompatible shapes. So how can one thing have both?
My first reaction was: obviously, at different times. That is not a contradiction, any more than a function having different values at different arguments. But the article said this "obvious" answer has a cost, and that Lewis used the problem to argue that we have temporal parts. I do not see the cost, and I do not see why temporal parts would help.
Could someone explain, with as little jargon as possible, why "at different times" is not the end of the story?