Thesis Aquinas’s metaphysics is unintelligible without Ibn Sina
Where it stands
I teach metaphysics at a seminary in Enugu, and my students arrive believing that Aquinas is a Catholic synthesis of Aristotle and the Bible. That leaves out the man in the middle.
My thesis is strong: Aquinas's metaphysics cannot be understood without Ibn Sina.
The centre of Thomist metaphysics is the distinction between essence and existence: what a thing is does not include that it is, so every created being receives its existence from another, and only in God are essence and existence identical. Aquinas's early De ente et essentia states this distinction and cites Avicenna repeatedly as he does so. The distinction is not in Aristotle in that form. It reached Latin through Ibn Sina's Healing, which was translated in the twelfth century, around the same time as Aristotle's Metaphysics itself. Latin readers met the essence–existence framework as a live tool, not as a later commentary.
From that distinction flow the Thomist proof of God from contingency, the doctrine of creation as the giving of existence, and the account of the soul. Remove Ibn Sina and you don't have a slightly different Aquinas. You have a different philosophy.
I tell my students this not to diminish Aquinas but to place him correctly: in a conversation that ran through Bukhara and Isfahan before it reached Paris. It is a lesson I also teach with the Igbo idea of chi: a tradition can receive deeply from another without being swallowed.
Objections welcome. I suspect the Boethius people will have something to say.