Thesis A correlation explains nothing until someone shows the mechanism
Where it stands
I build credit-scoring models for a mobile-money company. Our data say that people who charge their phones at regular times are more likely to repay small loans. The effect is real, stable and useful for prediction.
But when a manager says this explains repayment, I object. It explains nothing. Perhaps regular charging indicates regular work, or a stable home with electricity, or a personality that likes routine. Until we know which, we have a number, not an understanding.
There's a history to this in philosophy of science. Wesley Salmon first proposed that explaining an event means citing factors that are statistically relevant to it, that change its probability. Later he moved to a causal-mechanical account: you have explained something when you have shown the causal process that produced it. I think his second thoughts were right.
My thesis: statistical relevance on its own is never an explanation. It can justify prediction, sometimes action, but to explain you need a mechanism. Who disagrees?