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Thesis Anscombe was right: we see causing all the time

Hicham Ouazzani Fellow
· 6 replies
CausationAnalyticModern EuropeanDavid HumeElizabeth AnscombeIbn Tufayl#anscombe#causal-verbs#craft-knowledge#observing-causation
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Where it stands

I make cedar doors and ceilings in Tetouan. When I push a chisel through cedar I do not see a chisel, then a cut, and infer a connection. I see the chisel cutting. When my apprentice drops a plank and it cracks, he does not observe two events and form a habit. He sees the plank crack because it was dropped.

Hume said we never see necessary connection, only one thing following another. Elizabeth Anscombe, in her lecture "Causality and Determination" (1971), replied that we learn causal concepts through countless ordinary verbs, scrape, push, carry, burn and many more. To see someone pushing a cart is already to see causing. The general word "cause" is an abstraction from these specific ones, not a mysterious extra that observation has to find.

I think she is right, and that Hume was misled by thinking of perception as a series of separate pictures. Craftsmen don't perceive like that. Neither do children learning to play.

Anscombe also argued that causation need not mean necessitation: a cause can bring something about without its effect being guaranteed. That fits my workshop too. The same stroke sometimes splits the wood.

I am not a philosopher, so tell me where this goes wrong.

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6 replies

For the thesis 2

  1. Jorge Bonfim

    For Fellow

    For. In capoeira we learn moves with our bodies before we have words. When a partner's leg comes toward your head, you don't see a leg-motion and infer danger. You see the kick. Anscombe's verbs are body knowledge, and I think Hume underrated the body.

    Helpful · 3
  2. Hessa Al Mazrouei

    For Fellow

    For, with a historical note. Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy, alone on his island, learns about the world by cutting, burning, dissecting. Causal knowledge comes through his hands before his reasoning. I don't think Ibn Ṭufayl would have understood Hume's starting point, a mind receiving separate impressions. Hicham's workshop and Ḥayy's island are on the same side.

    Helpful · 1

Against the thesis 2

  1. Alistair Gow

    Against Fellow

    Against, as the resident Humean. Hicham, nobody doubts that you see the chisel cutting in the ordinary sense. Hume's question is what, in the visual experience itself, corresponds to the "because". Imagine a perfect film of the chisel, or a conjuror who makes the cut appear without contact. The experience could be the same, yet there'd be no causing. So the causing isn't part of what's seen; it's part of what's believed.

    Helpful · 1
    1. Hicham Ouazzani

      Fellow

      Alistair, but by that argument I never see a chisel either, because a film could show me one. Every perception could be faked. If that shows I don't see causing, it also shows I don't see doors.

      Helpful · 2
  2. Sam Ellery

    Against Fellow

    Against, on a logical point. Hicham's reply to Alistair is good, but it moves the argument. If seeing causing is like seeing doors, then the dispute is about whether causal concepts are perceptual concepts at all. Hume denies they are; Anscombe says they are. The film example doesn't decide that, but it shows the question isn't settled by how things feel in the workshop either.

    1. Hicham Ouazzani

      Fellow

      Sam, that's a fair correction. I'll narrow it: I can't show that causing is seen in Hume's strict sense, but I think his strict sense is a bad model of perception. Anscombe's verbs are a better one. And thank you, Hessa, I will read Ibn Ṭufayl.

      Helpful · 2