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Thesis

Remorse should count for nothing at sentencing, because no court can see it

Its coordinates: 6.2 Philosophy of Law

Where it stands

In thirty-one years of reporting from the courts of Lahore I watched a great many defendants weep before sentence. The ones with better lawyers wept better. Some of the ones I believed most were the ones who could not speak at all.

My thesis: a court should give no reduction for remorse as such, because remorse is invisible, and what the court rewards is the performance of it.

Three reasons:

  1. It rewards the articulate. The educated, the coached and the culturally fluent display remorse in the form judges expect. The poor, the proud, the frightened and the mentally ill often do not.
  2. It cannot be checked. Unlike an alibi, nothing could confirm or refute it.
  3. The fiqh saw this. Classical jurists did allow repentance (tawba) to remove certain fixed penalties, most famously for highway robbers who repent before they are captured (Qur'an 5:33–34). But notice what that requires: the robber gives himself up. Repentance counted when it took the form of an act the court could see.

So my proposal: count what the defendant does, such as confession, compensation, surrender and cooperation, and nothing for what he says he feels.

I expect to be told that mercy needs room for the heart. Tell me how a court can find it.

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4 replies

For the thesis 2

  1. Hamza Qureshi

    For Fellow

    For, as a litigant. I have sat in court opposite men who apologised beautifully and then appealed everything. Khalid Sahib's list of visible acts already includes everything remorse is good for: confession saves the victim a trial, compensation repairs, cooperation helps the court.

    Brian's point about intent is the strongest against, but intent is inferred from what was done before and during the act. Remorse is mostly inferred from what is said afterwards, by someone with every reason to say it.

  2. Tsion Bekele

    For Contributor

    For, from interpreting. When I translate a defendant's statement in court, half of what a judge would read as remorse is not in the words at all. It's in the bowed head, the lowered voice, the silence. In some of the languages I work with, an adult man does not weep in public, and pleading would be shameful. A judge from another background reads that as coldness.

    I can translate the words exactly and still lose the remorse, or invent it. That alone makes me uneasy about giving it legal weight.

Against the thesis 2

  1. Brian Otieno Ouma

    Against Contributor

    Against. In my prison reading class I see remorse grow over years, and much of it begins with the sentencing hearing, when a man hears the victim's family speak and has to stand there. If remorse counts for nothing, the hearing becomes a formality and the one moment that might start the change is wasted.

    I agree with you about performance. But "the court can't see it perfectly" isn't the same as "it can't see it at all". Judges also can't see intent, and we don't stop asking about intent.

  2. Sana Rizvi

    Against Fellow

    Against, though the "for" side is strong. Remove remorse and you don't remove discretion; you move it. Judges will still form an impression of the person, they will just stop saying so in the judgment where it can be appealed.

    I'd rather keep remorse on the record, with Tsion's warning built in: a judge should never treat its absence as a reason to increase a sentence. Count it when it is shown, never punish its silence.