Arendt says forgiving and promising are the only remedies for what we do. Can a state do either?
Its coordinates: 6.4.1 Distributive Justice
I'm rereading The Human Condition (1958) with a retired colleague, and we've stopped at the end of the chapter on action.
Arendt's argument goes like this. Human action has two weaknesses. It is irreversible: what is done cannot be undone. And it is unpredictable: nobody knows what an action will set going. The remedy for irreversibility is the power to forgive, which releases people from the consequences of what they have done. The remedy for unpredictability is the power to promise, which sets up, in her phrase, islands of predictability in an ocean of uncertainty. She credits Jesus of Nazareth with discovering the role of forgiveness in human affairs, and she adds that people cannot forgive what they cannot punish.
Here is my difficulty. For Arendt both remedies are between persons. But I grew up in a Germany that had to ask whether a state could apologise, and whether a new state could forgive or be forgiven. Treaties look like promises between states. Amnesties look like forgiveness by a state.
- Is an amnesty a kind of forgiveness, or only a decision not to punish?
- Can an institution promise, in Arendt's sense, or only the people in it?
- If neither, what is left to a state that has done great wrong?
Our Book corner has the book: The Human Condition.