Thesis
Mercy written into a rule is no longer mercy
Its coordinates: 6.4.1 Distributive Justice
Where it stands
For thirty-one years I watched sentences handed down in the courts of Lahore. The ones I remember are not the harshest but the merciful ones, and almost all of them were exceptions: a judge looking at an old man and finding a reason.
Thesis: Mercy cannot be made into a rule. Once leniency is written into guidelines and applied to everyone who meets the criteria, it becomes justice with a lower tariff. Mercy by its nature departs from what is owed.
Two traditions pull me in both directions.
In our law of retaliation, qiṣāṣ, the Qur'an (2:178) allows the heirs of a murdered person to forgive the killer and accept compensation instead, and calls this a lightening and a mercy from God. Here mercy lies in the hands of persons. It cannot be predicted, and it is not owed.
Kant, on the other hand, called the sovereign's right to grant clemency the most slippery of all his rights, because used wrongly it does great injustice. He wanted as little room for it as possible.
So: is mercy a virtue of persons that institutions can only leave room for? Or can a legal system be merciful in its rules, and not only in its exceptions?