Thesis My clients can’t tell walnut from stained beech, but they still mean walnut
Where it stands
Half the customers who order furniture from me ask for walnut. Most of them could not pick walnut out of a pile of stained beech if their life depended on it, and some unscrupulous workshops count on that.
A friend lent me Putnam's essay on the meaning of "meaning", and the bit about elms and beeches stopped me. Putnam says he cannot tell the two trees apart, yet his word "elm" refers to elms and "beech" to beeches, because the language has a division of linguistic labour: ordinary speakers use the words, and experts (botanists, foresters, carpenters) are the ones who can actually sort the things.
So here is my thesis. When my customer says "walnut", the word refers to walnut, not to "any dark wood that looks expensive", even though the picture in her head fits both. What fixes the meaning of the word is partly outside her: in the trees, and in people like me. If I sell her stained beech, I have not met her request under a looser meaning. I have cheated her.
If that is right, then meaning is not simply what is in the speaker's head. It is spread across a community and the world. I would like to hear the best case against this, because I suspect philosophers have one.