On the Coordinates: 1.7 Free Will and Determinism · 1.9 Laws of Nature · 2.8 Formal Epistemology
Also known as Laplace, Pierre-Simon de Laplace
1749 – 1827 · Beaumont-en-Auge (Normandy); Paris
Traditions: Modern European
In brief
Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749–1827) was a French mathematician and astronomer. He applied Newton’s theory of gravitation to the whole solar system and argued for its stability. Philosophically he matters for two linked ideas. The first is a classic statement of determinism: an intelligence that knew all the forces of nature and the positions of all things at one instant could calculate the whole past and future. Later writers called this figure ‘Laplace’s demon’. The second is a view of probability as a measure of partial knowledge. Since the world is fully determined, chance reflects what we do not know, and probabilities are worked out by counting ‘equally possible’ cases. Both ideas remain reference points in debates on free will, laws of nature and the foundations of probability.
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- Paris died
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- Modern European
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Life
Laplace was born at Beaumont-en-Auge in Normandy on 23 March 1749. After a Benedictine priory school he entered the University of Caen at sixteen, at first to study theology, and there turned to mathematics (MacTutor). He left without a degree and went to Paris with a letter of introduction to Jean d’Alembert, whose help gained him a post teaching mathematics at the École Militaire. He was elected an adjoint of the Académie des Sciences on 31 March 1773. With Antoine Lavoisier he carried out experiments that showed respiration to be a form of combustion. He married Marie-Charlotte de Courty de Romanges on 15 May 1788. When the learned societies were suppressed during the Revolution, the commission on weights and measures, of which he was a member, was the only one allowed to continue (MacTutor). After 1795 he was a leading figure at the Bureau des Longitudes and the Paris Observatory. Under Napoleon he was briefly Minister of the Interior in 1799, for six weeks, and then a member and later chancellor of the Senate. After the restoration of the Bourbons he was made a marquis in 1817. He died in Paris on 5 March 1827.
Problems
- If every state of the world follows from the one before by fixed laws, is the whole future already settled?
- Does determinism mean that the future could in principle be predicted, or are the two ideas separate?
- If the world is determined, what does it mean to call an event probable?
- How should we assign probabilities when we know nothing that favours one possibility over another?
- How far can past observations support a prediction that an event will happen again?
Core ideas
The all-knowing intelligence
In the Essai philosophique sur les probabilités (1814) Laplace says that we should regard the present state of the universe ‘as the effect of its anterior state’ and as the cause of the state that follows (Truscott and Emory translation). He then imagines an intelligence that knew all the forces acting in nature and the positions of all the things in it, and was ‘sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis’. For it, ‘nothing would be uncertain’, and ‘the future, as the past, would be present to its eyes’. The figure was later called ‘Laplace’s demon’; the SEP entry on causal determinism speaks of ‘a sufficiently bright demon’ and suggests that Laplace ‘probably had God in mind’. The passage became a standard statement of determinism: the state of the world at one time, together with the laws, fixes its state at every other time. It is therefore a starting point for the question whether free will can exist in such a world.
Determinism is not predictability
Laplace’s image ties determinism to prediction: the intelligence knows the future because it can compute it. The SEP entry on causal determinism argues that the two should be kept apart. A finite intelligence inside the world could not in practice do such a computation, and the entry states that ‘predictability and determinism are simply not logically connected at all’. A world could be determined yet beyond any calculation, or largely predictable without being determined. The SEP also reports that classical mechanics, the theory Laplace had in mind, allows determinism to fail. Examples include ‘space invaders’, particles that arrive from infinity with no prior cause, and Norton’s dome, on which a ball can begin to move without any cause, consistent with Newton’s laws. Quantum mechanics, as usually read, gives only probabilities for outcomes. So whether our world is Laplacean is an open question, not a settled consequence of physics.
Probability as partial knowledge
For Laplace, chance is not a feature of the world. Because everything is determined, we speak of probability only because we are ignorant of causes. In the Essai he writes: ‘Probability is relative, in part to this ignorance, in part to our knowledge.’ This makes probability a measure of how far our evidence supports a belief. It is an early form of the epistemic view of probability, as opposed to views that treat probabilities as physical frequencies or tendencies. The Essai, published in 1814, grew out of lectures he gave at the École Normale in 1795 and served as a general introduction to his Théorie analytique des probabilités (1812) (MacTutor).
The classical definition and the principle of indifference
The SEP entry on interpretations of probability names Laplace, with de Moivre, as a champion of the ‘classical’ interpretation and gives his as the best-known formulation. On this view the theory of chances consists in ‘reducing all events of the same kind to a certain number of equally possible cases’, and the probability of an event is the ratio of the favourable cases to all the possible ones. To decide which cases are equally possible, the classical view relies on what was later called the principle of indifference: with no reason to favour one alternative, give them equal probability. Two objections are standard. First, the definition seems circular, since ‘equally possible’ appears to mean equally probable (SEP). Second, Bertrand’s paradoxes show that, for continuous quantities, ‘the principle of indifference can be used in incompatible ways’ depending on how the problem is described, yielding different answers to the same question (SEP).
Reasoning from effects to causes
Laplace also worked on what was called inverse probability: inferring the probability of causes from observed effects. MacTutor’s reference list includes Stigler’s study of Laplace’s 1774 memoir on inverse probability, and MacTutor notes that his later probability work contains the rule that Poincaré afterwards named Bayes’s rule. One application is his rule of succession, which gives the probability that an event that has occurred a number of times in a row will occur again (SEP). This turns a version of the problem of induction into a calculation. Critics object that the answer depends on how prior probabilities are assigned before any evidence is in, which brings back the principle of indifference and its difficulties.
Works
- Exposition du système du monde 1796A non-mathematical account of astronomy, which presented the nebular hypothesis that the solar system formed from a contracting, cooling, rotating cloud of gas (MacTutor).
- Traité de mécanique céleste 1799–Five volumes on celestial mechanics, the first two in 1799 (MacTutor). MacTutor notes that it does not credit many ideas to the work of others.
- Théorie analytique des probabilités 1812His main mathematical treatise on probability (first edition 1812).
- Essai philosophique sur les probabilités 1814A non-technical introduction to probability based on his 1795 lectures at the École Normale; it contains the passage on the all-knowing intelligence. English translation by F. W. Truscott and F. L. Emory (1902).
Influences and relationships
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Shaped or answered Pierre-Simon Laplace 3
Influenced byIsaac Newton1643 – 1727
Laplace used Newton’s theory of gravitation to account for the observed deviations of the planets from their theoretical orbits and to study the stability of the solar system (Britannica).
Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica · stated on the profile of Pierre-Simon Laplace
Influenced byJean le Rond d’Alembertno profile yet
Laplace came to Paris with a letter of introduction to d’Alembert, who helped him obtain his post at the École Militaire (MacTutor).
Source: mathshistory.st-andrews.ac.uk · stated on the profile of Pierre-Simon Laplace
Criticised byJoseph Bertrandno profile yet
Bertrand’s paradoxes are a standard objection to the principle of indifference on which the classical, Laplacean interpretation relies: the principle can be applied in incompatible ways to the same problem (SEP).
Source: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy · stated on the profile of Pierre-Simon Laplace
Reception
Laplace’s reputation in his lifetime rested on celestial mechanics; MacTutor reports that he was not modest about his abilities and considered himself the best mathematician in France. Philosophically, his passage on the all-knowing intelligence became the textbook statement of determinism, cited in debates on free will and on the laws of nature. Later discussion, reported in the SEP, has questioned both whether classical physics is in fact deterministic and whether determinism should be defined by predictability. His classical interpretation of probability was criticised for circularity and for the paradoxes of the principle of indifference, and was largely replaced by frequency, logical and subjective interpretations. His treatment of probability as a measure of knowledge, and of inference from effects to causes, is often seen as anticipating modern Bayesian approaches.
Disputed interpretations
Is the world Laplacean?
Laplace took Newtonian mechanics to describe a deterministic world. The SEP reports that classical mechanics itself allows failures of determinism, such as space invaders and Norton’s dome, and that quantum mechanics is widely read as non-deterministic, though some interpretations restore determinism. Whether our world is deterministic remains open.
Should determinism be defined by prediction?
Laplace’s image links the fixed future with an intelligence able to compute it. The SEP argues that the two notions are logically separate and that the worry about determinism concerns physical necessity rather than whether anyone could predict. Others still use predictability as a working test for determinism.
Can ignorance ground probabilities?
The classical view assigns equal probabilities to cases we have no reason to distinguish. Critics argue that this is circular and that Bertrand’s paradoxes show it gives conflicting answers (SEP). Objective Bayesian views keep descendants of the principle, such as appeals to maximum entropy (SEP).
Primary texts
- A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities (trans. F. W. Truscott and F. L. Emory, 1902) Free to read · Project GutenbergProject Gutenberg eBook 58881; English translation of the Essai philosophique sur les probabilités.
Sources
- MacTutor History of Mathematics: Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749–1827) – Biography mathshistory.st-andrews.ac.uk
- Encyclopaedia Britannica: Pierre-Simon, marquis de Laplace Encyclopaedia Britannica
- SEP: Causal Determinism Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- SEP: Interpretations of Probability Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Project Gutenberg: A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, by Pierre Simon Laplace Project Gutenberg
Scholarly sources and reference works, free to read online.
Related questions
- 1.7 Free Will and DeterminismCould you have done otherwise?
- 1.9 Laws of NatureDo laws of nature make things happen, or only describe what happens?
- 2.8 Formal EpistemologyBy how much should this evidence move you?
Guides
In the Book corner
- A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities
Laplace's non-technical account of probability theory, first published in 1814 as the introduction to the second edition of his Théorie analytique des…
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On the Atlas
Where the sources place Pierre-Simon Laplace, and what the sources say was done there.
- ParisDied 1827
Cite this page
Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 30 October 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
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BibTeX
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author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Pierre-Simon Laplace},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/thinker/pierre-simon-laplace/},
note = {Source-checked 30 October 2026}
}RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Pierre-Simon Laplace T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/10/30 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/thinker/pierre-simon-laplace/ LA - en ER -
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