Thesis The deviant causal chain shows the causal theory of action cannot be repaired
Where it stands
I'm a logician, so I care about analyses that can be stated precisely, and this one, I'll argue, can't be.
Davidson's causal theory: a movement is an action when it's caused in the right way by the agent's reasons, a belief–desire pair. Davidson's own counterexample, the climber: a climber wants to be rid of the weight of his companion on the rope, and believes loosening his grip would do it. The thought so unnerves him that his hands shake and he lets go. Belief and desire caused the movement; the movement achieved the goal; he didn't intentionally let go.
The obvious repair is to say what "in the right way" means. Every attempt I know of has drawn new counterexamples: require the causation to be "non-deviant", and you need to define deviance; require the reasons to "guide" the movement, and guidance turns out to be either another causal notion (with its own deviant cases) or an unanalysed notion of control.
My thesis: the repair can't be done, because "in the right way" means "in the way that makes it an action". The analysis is circular. That doesn't mean reasons aren't causes. It means the concept of action is more basic than the causal analysis, and Anscombe was right to start from the "why?" question instead.
I'd like to hear the best repair attempt, and why I'm wrong to think it fails.