Thesis
Mathematical knowledge can be Gettiered, and Kempe’s four colour “proof” shows how
Its coordinates: 1.1.4 Abstract Objects · 6.9 Philosophy of Mathematics
Where it stands
A friend in my logic tutorials insists that today's question of the day can't touch mathematics. A proof either works or it doesn't, so a mathematician can't be right by luck. I think she's wrong, and here is the case.
In 1879 Alfred Kempe published a proof that every map can be coloured with four colours so that no two neighbouring regions share one. It was accepted for eleven years. In 1890 Percy Heawood found a flaw. The four colour theorem itself was finally proved by Appel and Haken in 1976, with heavy computer help.
My thesis: a mathematician in 1885 who believed the theorem on the strength of Kempe's proof had a justified, true belief that was not knowledge. Justified, because the proof had been checked and accepted. True, because the theorem is true. Not knowledge, because the reason she had for it was broken, and only luck made the conclusion right.
The best replies I can imagine:
- A flawed proof justifies nothing, so this is just a false belief about having a proof.
- She knew it by testimony from the mathematical community, and testimony can be Gettiered anywhere, so mathematics is nothing special.
Lakatos would enjoy this: proofs are less final than textbooks pretend. For or against?