Thesis Atheists should retire the logical problem of evil: Plantinga answered it
Where it stands
I'm an atheist and I spend weekends with a rationalist association exposing miracle tricks in villages. So this is a thesis against my own side's habits.
In "Evil and Omnipotence" (1955), J. L. Mackie argued that theism is not just unlikely but inconsistent: an omnipotent, wholly good God and the existence of evil cannot all be true together, given plausible principles about goodness and power.
Alvin Plantinga's free will defence (set out in God, Freedom, and Evil, 1974) replied that this inconsistency has not been shown. If free creatures are a great good, and if it is possible that every free creature God could create would go wrong at least once, then it is possible that God could not create a world with free creatures and no evil. Plantinga doesn't need this to be true, only possible, because Mackie claimed a contradiction. And Mackie himself, in The Miracle of Theism (1982), conceded that the problem of evil does not show the central doctrines of theism to be logically inconsistent.
So my thesis: when atheists at debates still say "God and evil are logically contradictory", we are using an argument our own best philosopher gave up. We should use William Rowe's evidential argument instead: not contradiction, but the sheer amount of apparently pointless suffering, like his fawn burning in a forest fire, as evidence against a good and powerful God.
Fellow atheists, tell me why I'm wrong. Believers, tell me if Rowe is any easier for you.