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Thesis

A conscript who fights well in an unjust war does nothing wrong by fighting

Choi Byeong-hun Fellow
· 5 replies
War & violenceAnalyticMichael Walzer#combatants#conscription#just-war#moral-equality
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Its coordinates: 3.3.5 War and Political Violence

Where it stands

I served twenty-two years, the last part on the DMZ. Most of the young men I trained were conscripts doing their compulsory service. None of them chose the war they might be sent to.

Michael Walzer, in Just and Unjust Wars (1977), defends what he calls the moral equality of soldiers. The justice of going to war (jus ad bellum) is the responsibility of leaders. The justice of conduct in war (jus in bello) is the responsibility of soldiers. So a soldier who fights within the rules, attacking only combatants, does nothing wrong, whichever side he is on. He may be killed, and he may kill, as the soldiers opposite may.

The modern objection, made most strongly by Jeff McMahan, is that this cannot be right. A soldier fighting for an unjust cause is like an attacker in a street fight: the person defending himself has a right to resist, but the attacker has no right to kill the defender. Following the rules does not make an unjust attack just.

Thesis: Walzer is right, at least for conscripts. A young man who fights well in a war he did not choose and could not judge does nothing wrong by fighting.

I hold this, but not comfortably. I have seen what "moral injury" means in men who did their duty and could not live with it afterwards. Please mark your side.

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5 replies

For the thesis 2

  1. Henrike Vogel

    For Fellow

    For, as far as it goes. The Nuremberg principles rejected "superior orders" as a defence for war crimes, which is Walzer's in bello responsibility. But the charge of crimes against peace, waging aggressive war, was brought only against leaders and planners, never against ordinary soldiers.

    So even Nuremberg, which was hardly lenient, kept Walzer's division. Germany learned the lesson that a soldier must refuse a criminal order, not that he must judge the war.

  2. Choi Byeong-hun

    For Fellow

    Kwame's distinction between excuse and justification is the one I have been avoiding, and I think it is the honest place to stand. It also explains moral injury, the term Jonathan Shay gave to what he saw in veterans: a man can be excused by everyone and still not excuse himself. I'll keep my side for the conscripts, but as an excuse, not as Walzer's full equality.

Against the thesis 3

  1. Andrés Zuluaga

    Against Fellow

    Against. In Colombia I have interviewed former combatants from every side, many recruited very young, some forced. Almost all of them say the same thing: I followed orders, I did not choose the war. Some of them are telling the truth.

    But the victims I interview the same week do not accept "I did not choose it" as an end to the conversation, and I think they are right. Not choosing a war reduces blame. It does not make the killing nothing.

  2. Kwame Asante

    Against Fellow

    Against, partly. The argument that soldiers cannot judge the justice of the war is weaker than it looks for many soldiers. Some wars are obviously aggressive, and a soldier who can read a newspaper knows it.

    I'd accept a version of the thesis for conscripts who genuinely could not know, or could not refuse without grave cost. That is an excuse, not a justification. The difference matters, because an excuse admits that something wrong was done.

  3. Gerrit Venter

    Against Fellow

    Against, as a former conscript. White South African men of my generation were called up for national service. A few of my classmates refused and paid for it with prison or exile. I did not refuse. I was never in combat, but I wore the uniform of a state whose cause I now think was unjust, and at nineteen I did not think about it at all.

    I don't believe I did wrong in the way the men who directed that state did. But Kwame's distinction is the honest one: I may be excused, not justified. The difference matters, because an excuse leaves something to account for later and a justification does not. When I coached boys, I told them the referee's whistle doesn't make a dirty tackle clean. I should have heard myself.

    Choi, perhaps moral injury is the account arriving, even where no blame is owed.