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African Philosophy: Myth and Reality

Sur la « philosophie africaine »

Paulin J. Hountondji · 1976 (English translation 1983) · Medium (150–350 pages)

4.5 from 2 reviews · 46 views

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What it is

A collection of essays by the Beninese philosopher Paulin Hountondji that became a starting point of the debate over what African philosophy is. Hountondji attacks what he calls ethnophilosophy: works such as Placide Tempels's Bantu Philosophy, which claimed to describe the implicit, collective worldview of a whole people and to call it philosophy. Such works, he argues, assume a unanimity that no society has, and they speak for Africans, often to European readers, without letting individual Africans argue. Philosophy on his account is a body of explicit texts produced by individual thinkers in critical dialogue with one another, so African philosophy is simply philosophy produced by Africans, and its future depends on science, writing and open debate. The book includes essays on Anton Wilhelm Amo, the eighteenth-century philosopher born in what is now Ghana who taught in Germany, and on Kwame Nkrumah's Consciencism.

Why read it

It forced a whole field to state its standards, and its argument about who gets to speak for a culture applies far beyond Africa.

Where to start

Read the opening chapters, where the critique of ethnophilosophy is made, before the essays on Amo and Nkrumah.

Reviews

  1. Emeka Nwosu

    Coming from physics, I liked his insistence that philosophy goes with science and a written culture of criticism. His complaint that ethnophilosophy describes Africans to Europeans instead of letting Africans argue with each other is one I recognise from my own education. The essay on Amo was a revelation; I had never heard of him.

  2. Kwame Asante

    Every African philosophy course in Accra meets this argument, often with Hountondji cast as the villain. He is not one. His insistence on individual authorship and critique is a demand for respect, not a dismissal of tradition. My disagreement, with Wiredu and Gyekye, is that he underestimated how much philosophy oral traditions contain. Read it anyway; nobody escapes it.