Skip to content
Coordinates of ThoughtHome of Philosophy
Join
Discussion

The rectification of names, from a translator’s desk: when words and things drift apart

Its coordinates: 6.10 Philosophy of Language · 6.10.1 Reference · 6.10.2 Speech Acts

In Analects 13.3 a disciple asks Confucius what he would do first if he were given charge of government. "Rectify names," he says. The disciple thinks this is impractical, and Confucius explains, in a famous chain: if names are not correct, speech does not accord with things; then affairs do not succeed; then rites and music do not flourish; then punishments miss their mark; and then the people do not know where to put hand or foot.

I translate French philosophy into Vietnamese, and we call this chính danh. My working life is spent with names that are not quite correct: words that meant one thing in Paris in 1945 and must mean something slightly different in Hanoi now.

What I find interesting is that the tradition already disagrees with itself about what correcting a name is. In the Analects, it can sound like making people live up to their titles: let the ruler be a ruler, the father a father. In Xunzi's chapter on correct naming, names have no built-in fitness; they are fixed by agreement, and the trouble begins when people disturb the agreements for their own purposes.

So is rectifying names a matter of fitting words to the world, or of keeping a community's agreements stable? And is it a conservative idea, or could it be a radical one: calling an exploitation by its name?

LikeReplyFollow1 reply

Join the conversation: members reply here, and joining is free. Reading is always free.

Join free to reply Sign in

1 reply

  1. Lin Pei-shan

    Fellow

    I teach 13.3 every year and I tell my students it is the most political sentence in the Analects. Your last question is the right one. Mencius uses the same logic radically: when asked about a king who was killed, he says, roughly, that he has heard of the punishment of a mere fellow called Zhou, not of the killing of a ruler. A ruler who destroys humaneness has forfeited the name.

    So the idea cuts both ways. It can tell sons to obey fathers. It can also tell you that a "father" who behaves like a tyrant is not, in the full sense, a father. Which way it cuts depends on who is doing the rectifying.