Thesis Refusing to aggregate is contractualism’s best feature, not its embarrassing bug
Its coordinates: 3.2 Normative Ethics · 3.2.1 Consequence-Based Approaches · 3.2.2 Duty-Based Approaches +3 more
Where it stands
Scanlon's transmitter room case: a technician is trapped under equipment in a TV station, receiving painful electric shocks. Freeing him means interrupting the broadcast of a big football match for fifteen minutes, and millions of people are watching. Add up the millions of small disappointments and, on a simple aggregative view, they could outweigh his suffering. Almost nobody believes we should leave him there.
Contractualism explains why. Complaints are made by individuals. No single viewer has a complaint that comes close to his, and you can't stack viewers into a super-viewer. So rescue him.
I build machine learning systems, and I think this matters well beyond philosophy seminars. A lot of what I see justified in tech is aggregation: a feature that slightly improves the experience of millions while seriously harming a few thousand people gets shipped, because the totals look good. The individualist restriction is the one principled tool I know that says the totals are not the whole story.
The usual objection is the numbers problem: if only individual complaints count, why save five people rather than one when you can't save both? Scanlon has a "tie-breaker" reply, and critics say it smuggles aggregation back in. I'm willing to take that cost, or to accept some limited aggregation among comparable harms. What I'm not willing to give up is the veto.
Argue me out of it.