What do I owe a source I don’t believe? Notes from a court reporter
Its coordinates: 2.2.4 Testimony
I cover courts and human rights in Karachi. Every week someone tells me something I am not sure I believe: a family about a disappeared relative, an official about a raid, a lawyer about what his client said. I have to decide what to print. But lately I've been thinking about a different question: what do I owe the person when I doubt them?
There is a view in the philosophy of testimony, the assurance view, which says that telling someone something is not like handing them a piece of evidence. When you tell me, you take responsibility for its truth and invite me to trust you. If that is right, doubting someone is not a neutral act of evidence-weighing. It is a response to an invitation, and refusing it says something to them.
That matches my experience. People can tell when you don't believe them, and it wounds differently from being contradicted by a document.
One thing that helped me was learning how classical hadith scholars assessed transmitters. They did not ask a single question, "is this person reliable?" They separated a narrator's probity, ʿadāla, from his precision in retaining and transmitting, ḍabṭ. A pious man with a poor memory and a sharp man of doubtful character failed for different reasons.
I now try to do the same: when I doubt a source, I ask myself whether I doubt their honesty or their accuracy, and I try to let them know which. Is that enough? What else is owed?