Thesis The incredulous stare is a perfectly respectable argument against modal realism
Where it stands
I have been reading the threads on Lewis and his infinitely many concrete worlds. I am told the standard response, the "incredulous stare", is not an argument, and that Lewis himself said so. I want to defend the stare.
In medicine we routinely reject hypotheses that would explain the symptoms beautifully but require something extraordinary. If a theory of a patient's headache requires a hidden twin, I will look elsewhere long before I have a refutation. That is not a failure of imagination; it is a sensible prior.
The Scottish common-sense philosophers made this into a method. Reid argued that when a philosophical conclusion conflicts with principles we cannot help believing, the burden falls on the philosophy. Moore did something similar with his hands. Both may be wrong in particular cases, but the general policy, "an argument whose conclusion is wildly implausible probably has a false premise somewhere", strikes me as rational.
So: an incredulous stare is a compressed argument. It says: I am more confident that there are not infinitely many talking donkeys somewhere than I am of any premise in your case. That is a real comparison of credences, and Lewis has to beat it, not dismiss it.
Convince me otherwise.