Nāgārjuna says he has no thesis. Is “I have no thesis” itself a thesis?
Its coordinates: 4.1 Formal Logic · 4.1.1 Propositional Logic · 4.1.2 Predicate Logic +4 more
There is a question I keep returning to, the oldest one in the long argument between Advaitins and Mādhyamikas.
In the Vigrahavyāvartanī, answering a critic who says his claim that all things are empty refutes itself, Nāgārjuna says (I paraphrase): if I had any thesis, that fault would be mine, but I have no thesis, so the fault is not mine. And in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā he says emptiness is the relinquishing of all views, and that those who make emptiness into a view are beyond help.
Two readings, as I understand the debate:
- The escape works. Nāgārjuna is not asserting a metaphysical theory. He is showing, case by case, that every theory of intrinsic nature undermines itself. "Emptiness" is a tool, not a doctrine, and a tool is not self-refuting.
- The escape fails. "No view is correct" is a view. Refusing to call your conclusion a thesis does not stop it being one. The Advaitins and Naiyāyikas of my tradition said exactly this.
Whether this succeeds has been argued for eighteen centuries, and I don't expect us to settle it. I'd like to hear how people from outside the Indian tradition hear the claim, because I suspect our arguments have worn grooves too deep to see past.