Thesis
Breeding dogs for looks that make them suffer is wrong, even though those dogs could not have existed otherwise
Its coordinates: 3.3.2 Environmental Ethics · 3.3.6 Animal Ethics
Where it stands
A debate motion with a philosophical sting in its tail.
Thesis: Breeding dogs for features that predictably cause them suffering, such as muzzles so short that they struggle to breathe, is wrong, even though the dogs bred that way could not have existed otherwise.
The first half is easy to agree with. Many vets have said for years that some popular body shapes come with breathing difficulties, eye problems and spinal trouble.
The second half is where it gets hard. This is a version of Derek Parfit's non-identity problem. A particular puppy exists only because these two parents were bred. Had the breeder chosen healthier lines, a different dog would exist, not a healthier version of this one. So if the puppy's life is still worth living, who has been wronged? Not the puppy, it seems: the alternative was not existing at all.
For: something can be wrong without making any particular individual worse off. Bringing a creature into existence with avoidable suffering is wrong because of the suffering, whoever bears it.
Against: wrongs need victims. If no dog is worse off than it would otherwise have been, the objection must be about something else: our taste, our profits, or our sense of what dogs should be.
Please mark your side.