A company can be sued but cannot be tripped over. In what sense does it exist?
Last month I spent four hearings arguing against a company. It had a registered office, a seal, a board, and a lawyer almost as tiresome as I am. What it did not have was a body. You cannot trip over it, and if every director resigned tomorrow it would still owe my client money.
Lawyers have argued about this for a long time. The old "fiction theory", usually traced to Savigny, says the corporation is a person only because the law pretends it is. The "real entity" view, associated with Gierke, says groups have a real life of their own and the law merely recognises it. Hart, in his Oxford inaugural lecture, warned that asking "what is a corporation?" in the abstract leads nowhere, and that we should look instead at how sentences about companies are used in legal reasoning.
I recently came across a neat way of laying out the options, which I paraphrase:
- It exists straightforwardly, because it has effects: it pays taxes, signs contracts, gets sued.
- It exists derivatively, the way a queue does: real, but nothing over and above people and their arrangements.
- Strictly it does not exist; "the company" is shorthand for a vast number of facts about people and documents.
- The question is malformed, because "exists" is being used in two senses at once.
What strikes me is that nothing about the company is in dispute. We agree on the shareholders, the accounts, the office in Gulberg. The disagreement is purely about what to say exists. I would like to hear from people who handle institutions in practice: which of the four do you find yourself assuming, and does it ever change an outcome?