Thesis
A zoo that exists for conservation still wrongs the animals it keeps
Its coordinates: 3.3.2 Environmental Ethics · 3.3.6 Animal Ethics
Where it stands
Animal ethics asks who counts, about creatures that cannot answer for themselves. Here is a thesis for debate.
Thesis: Even a zoo that genuinely exists for conservation, breeding endangered species and funding work in the wild, wrongs the individual animals it keeps.
For: On a rights view like Tom Regan's, animals that are "subjects-of-a-life" have value of their own and may not be used merely as means, however good the end. Keeping an elephant for the sake of elephants in general is using her. Martha Nussbaum, extending the capabilities approach to animals in Frontiers of Justice, asks whether each creature can live the characteristic life of its kind. For wide-ranging species, an enclosure fails that test almost by design.
Against: Several species survive only because of breeding programmes, and some have been returned to the wild from captive stock: the Arabian oryx, extinct in the wild by the early 1970s, was reintroduced in Oman in 1982, and Przewalski's horse was returned to Mongolia in the 1990s. For many animals, especially small or sedentary ones, a well-run zoo may not frustrate their nature at all. And for some species the alternative is not freedom but extinction.
Please mark your side. We are especially interested in whether the answer changes from species to species, and in views from traditions that do not frame the question in terms of rights.