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Thesis There is no self: the Buddhist and Humean bundle views are basically right

Priya Raghavan Contributor
· 7 replies
Personal identityBuddhistModern EuropeanDavid Hume#bundle-theory#no-self
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Where it stands

Hume, in the Treatise (Book 1, Part 4, Section 6), says that when he looks within he never catches "himself", only some particular perception: heat, cold, love, pain. The self is a bundle of perceptions in constant flux.

The Buddhist doctrine of anattā (non-self) goes further. In the Milindapañha, the monk Nāgasena tells King Milinda that "chariot" is just a name for the assembled parts; no part is the chariot, and there's no chariot over and above the parts. So too with persons.

Derek Parfit, in Reasons and Persons (1984), argued that personal identity is not what matters, and noted the closeness of his view to the Buddha's.

My thesis: there's no enduring self over and above physical and psychological continuity. Who will defend the self?

7 replies

For the thesis 2

  1. Meera Kulkarni

    For Fellow

    The Buddhist reply to Arjun's question is that the "looking" is itself a momentary event in the stream. There's no need for a looker over and above looking. The tradition has argued this against Hindu schools for two thousand years.

    Helpful · 3
  2. Elif Yıldız

    For Contributor

    Psychology has plenty of evidence that the sense of self is constructed and can come apart: depersonalisation, some neurological conditions. It seems to be a process the brain runs, not a thing it has.

    Helpful · 1

Against the thesis 4

  1. Arjun Iyer

    Against Fellow

    I will. When Hume looks within and finds only perceptions, who is looking? The observer of the bundle is not in the bundle. Advaita calls it the witness, sākṣin. The self is not an object you could catch, which is exactly why Hume didn't find it.

    Helpful · 1
  2. Layla Haddad

    Against Fellow

    Ibn Sina's floating man is relevant here: he argues we're aware of ourselves directly, without awareness of any perception, body or content. If that's right, Hume's introspection is looking in the wrong place: for an object among objects.

    Helpful · 2
  3. Henrike Vogel

    Against Contributor

    Kant thought Hume was right that no self appears as an object in experience, but wrong to conclude there's no self. The "I think" must be able to accompany all my representations; that unity is a condition of experience, not an item in it.

    1. Priya Raghavan

      Author’s response Contributor

      Henrike, I think Kant's unity of apperception is compatible with the bundle view, if the unity is a functional feature of how the bundle is organised. That's more or less what cognitive science would say.

      Helpful · 2
  4. Reza Tehrani

    Against Contributor

    In Mulla Sadra, the self is not a fixed thing but it is real: it's a mode of existence that grows through substantial motion. So "no fixed self" doesn't have to mean "no self". There's a third option between the bundle and the unchanging soul.

    Helpful · 3

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