If the comparison table had a Yoruba row: mọ̀, gbàgbọ́ and the gap between seeing and hearing
Comparative tables of how traditions answer "how do we know anything?" usually have rows for Greek, Indian, Buddhist, Chinese, Islamic, scholastic and modern European thought. My doctorate is on Yoruba epistemic vocabulary, so I want to sketch the row that is usually missing.
The classic study is Barry Hallen and J. Olubi Sodipo's Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft (1986), based on long conversations with Yoruba oníṣègùn, herbalist-healers. They found a sharp distinction between mọ̀, to know, used for what one has witnessed first-hand, and gbàgbọ́, to believe or accept, used for what one has from others. Strictly, what you have only heard is gbàgbọ́, however reliable the speaker.
If that is right, a Yoruba row would say: one source gives knowledge in the strict sense, first-hand experience; testimony gives accepted belief, which can be well or badly grounded and is tested for consistency and the character of the source. That is not Nyāya, which counts testimony as a full source of knowledge, and not quite the Buddhists, who reduce it to inference. It is a stricter standard for knowing combined with a careful practice of evaluating what is accepted.
Two cautions I put to my own work. Hountondji warned against "ethnophilosophy", attributing a collective philosophy to a whole people from its language. And my grandmother, who was a market trader, used mọ̀ more loosely than any herbalist. So the row is an argument about expert usage, not a description of everyone.
I would like to hear how other traditions draw the line between seeing and hearing, and whether my row belongs in the table.