Thesis The argument from divine hiddenness is stronger than the argument from evil
Where it stands
I'm a second-year undergraduate and the resident sceptic in my effective altruism group, so I'm used to being outnumbered. Here's a thesis I want tested.
The argument from evil gets all the attention, but theists have well-developed replies: free will, soul-making, goods we cannot see. Whatever you think of them, they at least make sense of suffering as part of a relationship with God.
J. L. Schellenberg's hiddenness argument seems harder to answer. Roughly: a perfectly loving God would always be open to a relationship with any creature capable of one. Such a relationship requires believing God exists. So if God existed, there would be no one who sincerely wants to believe, isn't resisting, and still can't. But there are such people. So God does not exist.
Why I think it's stronger: the standard replies to evil appeal to goods that require the relationship. Hiddenness denies the relationship to people who are not resisting it. The free-will reply doesn't apply, because nonresistant nonbelievers aren't misusing their freedom. And soul-making through doubt seems an odd gift to give someone who would gladly accept the relationship itself.
Show me where this goes wrong.