Better Never to Have Been

A rigorous defence of anti-natalism, the view that coming into existence is always a serious harm and that it is wrong to have children. Benatar's central argument rests on an asymmetry between pain and pleasure. The presence of pain is bad and the presence of pleasure is good. But the absence of pain is good even if no one exists to enjoy that good, while the absence of pleasure is not bad unless someone exists who is deprived of it. So never existing comes out better. A second argument holds that ordinary lives contain far more bad than people think, since optimism bias and adaptation distort our judgements. He then draws conclusions for procreation, arguing for an anti-natal view; for abortion, defending what he calls a 'pro-death' view in the earlier stages of pregnancy; and for population, arguing that it would be better if humanity gradually died out. Many critics reject the asymmetry, and some treat his conclusions as a reductio of its premises.

It is the most careful philosophical statement of anti-natalism, and engaging with its asymmetry argument sharpens thinking about harm, existence and the ethics of having children.