Card 6.29 · Root VI — The Philosophy of X Family · △ contested Contested
Philosophy of Gender
What kind of thing is a gender category?
This question asks what kind of category gender is — what makes it real if it is real, and how it relates to sex.
On this card
Where it sits
Under VI. Philosophy of X. Borders 1.1.2 Universals, 6.7 Social ontology, 6.30 Philosophy of race, 6.12 Philosophy of biology.
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The rival answers
| Position | Gender categories are |
|---|---|
| Biological realism | Grounded in reproductive biology; the categories track a natural division |
| Social position accounts | Defined by position in a social hierarchy, not by bodily features |
| Norm-relevancy accounts | Defined by which social norms a person is held to |
| Identity-based accounts | Constituted by a person's self-understanding |
| Cluster accounts | A family of features, none necessary, held together by resemblance |
| Gender eliminativism | Not real kinds; the categories should be abandoned |
| Gender pluralism | The term picks out different things in different contexts, all legitimate |
△ contested A contested question: philosophers disagree about the answer, or about how the question should be framed. The book sets out each side and takes none.
Where do you stand?
What kind of thing is a gender category?
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Key figures
| Figure | Dates | Tradition | Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mary Wollstonecraft | 1759–1797 | European modern | Extended the rights argument by consistency |
| Simone de Beauvoir | 1908–1986 | French | One is not born but becomes a woman |
| Sally Haslanger | b. 1955 | Analytic | Social position account; ameliorative method |
| Judith Butler | b. 1956 | Continental | Performativity; gender as repeated enactment |
| Talia Mae Bettcher | b. 1966 | Analytic | First-person authority in self-identification |
| Alex Byrne | b. 1960 | Analytic | Defence of a biological analysis |
| Mary Astell | 1666–1731 | European modern | Women are rational beings owed education, and marital subordination is not natural |
| Christine de Pizan | 1364–c. 1430 | European | Rebutted the authority of misogynist texts by argument and counter-example |
Talk about it here
Conversations about this question in Gender, race & identity:
- Appiah is right: racial terms are empty, like ‘phlogiston’, and we should stop talking as if they named kinds 7 replies
- Haslanger’s ameliorative method changes the subject rather than answering the question 7 replies
- Affirmative action is required by justice, not merely permitted 6 replies
- Writing an eligibility rule taught me that metaphysics doesn’t settle policy 6 replies
- Is the circularity objection to identity-based accounts of gender fatal, or a misunderstanding? 6 replies
Join free to ask about it Everything in Gender, race & identity
Connections
→ 1.1.2, 6.7 · ↔ 6.30, 6.12, 1.10, 6.4.2 · ◇ biological realism, social position accounts, identity-based accounts, eliminativism · ○ Modern; Table 7
→ depends on · ↔ borders: genuine overlap, neither prior · ◇ answered by: points from question to answers · ○ appears in: points to the timeline and the comparisons
The full card is in the book
In The Coordinates of Thought this card goes on to a worked example that sets the answers against one case, and to where the question touches daily life — page 334.