Card 3.2.6 · Root III — Ethics and Axiology
Divine Command Approaches
How does a command create an obligation?
Divine command theories hold that moral obligation — and on some versions moral status more broadly — depends on divine will or command; nature-based views, which ground goodness in the divine nature, are close relatives.
Where it sits
Under 3.2 Normative ethics. Depends on 3.1, 2.2.5 Revelation. Borders 6.1, 6.2.
The rival answers
| Approach | Claim |
|---|---|
| Voluntarism | Obligation derives from the divine will as such |
| Modified divine command | Moral obligation depends on the commands of a loving God; goodness is not itself reduced to command |
| Natural law | Commands are legible in the structure of created nature; reason can read them |
| Nature-identity views | Goodness is identical with the divine nature, not a product of will |
| Maqasid approaches | Law read through its purposes — preservation of life, reason, lineage, property, religion |
| Mu'tazili rationalism | Moral facts are knowable by reason and bind independently |
Key figures
| Figure | Dates | Tradition | Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|
| Al-Ash'ari | 874–936 | Islamic | Obligation grounded in command |
| Al-Shatibi | d. 1388 | Islamic | Maqasid al-shari'a; law interpreted through its objectives |
| Thomas Aquinas | 1225–1274 | Scholastic | Natural law as participation in eternal law |
| William of Ockham | c. 1287–1347 | Scholastic | Strong voluntarism |
| Robert Adams | 1937–2024 | Analytic | Modified divine command theory |
| al-Māturīdī | d. 944 | Islamic | Reason can recognize some moral values and elementary duties; revelation remains necessary for fuller moral guidance |
Also on this question: Shah Waliullah
Connections
→ 3.2, 3.1 · ↔ 2.2.5, 6.1, 6.2, 3.1.1 · ◇ voluntarism, modified divine command, natural law, nature-identity views, maqasid, Mu'tazili rationalism · ○ Islamic golden age; Scholastic; Tables 4 and 5 .
→ narrower questions · ↔ questions it borders · ◇ the positions, mapped in Part III of the book · ○ the eras and comparison tables (Parts IV and V)
The full card is in the book
In The Coordinates of Thought this card goes on to a worked example that sets the answers against one case, and to where the question touches daily life — page 154.
On Coordinates of Thought
Conversations about this question in Moral theories:
- The buyer at the gate offers more than the cooperative: does a promise bind when breaking it pays? 6 replies
- Reading group: Kant’s Groundwork, Section I, the good will and the honest shopkeeper 6 replies
- Reading group: Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (1982), read forty years on 6 replies
- The crane logs were falsified and reporting them might shut the terminal: what each theory told me 6 replies
- Williams’s integrity objection, not the arithmetic, is the deepest problem for utilitarianism 6 replies