Card 2.5 · Root II — Epistemology
Truth
What makes a statement true?
This node asks what truth is — what makes a statement true, and whether "true" names a substantial property at all.
Where it sits
Under II. Epistemology. Borders 2.1, 2.3.1, 1.10, 6.10.1.
The rival answers
| Theory | Truth is | The thing it struggles with |
|---|---|---|
| Correspondence | A match between statement and reality | What a fact is, and what matching consists in |
| Coherence | Fit within a system of beliefs | A coherent falsehood |
| Pragmatic theories | Truth connected to successful inquiry, verification or practical function, with the account differing by theorist | Useful falsehoods; truths no inquiry could reach |
| Deflationary | No substantial property; "is true" is a device of assertion and generalisation | Generalisations like "most of what he says is true" |
| Identity | A true thought is identical with the fact | Collapsing the distinction it needs |
| Truthmaker | Grounded in what exists to make it so | Negative truths; what makes it true that there are no unicorns |
Key figures
| Figure | Dates | Tradition | Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aristotle | 384–322 BCE | Greek | To say of what is that it is, is true |
| Nyaya school | Classical | Indian | Veridical cognition (pramā): cognition that gets its object right; later Nyāya treats certification of its epistemic success as extrinsic |
| Ibn Sina | 980–1037 | Islamic | A systematic doctrine of truth in the Ilāhiyyāt, tied to his account of existence and first principles |
| Alfred Tarski | 1901–1983 | Analytic | A formal definition for regimented languages |
| William James | 1842–1910 | Pragmatist | Truth as what proves expedient in our thinking, in the long run and on the whole |
| Frank Ramsey | 1903–1930 | Analytic | The redundancy theory |
| Protagoras | c. 490–420 BCE | Greek | Man is the measure of all things — read, since Plato's Theaetetus, as making truth relative to the one who judges |
| C. S. Peirce | 1839–1914 | Pragmatist | Truth is what inquiry would converge on in the long run |
Connections
→ 2.1 · ↔ 2.3.1, 1.10, 6.10.1, 6.8.2 · ◇ correspondence theory, coherence theory, pragmatic theory, deflationism, identity theory, truthmaker theory · ○ Axial Age; Modern; Table 3
→ narrower questions · ↔ questions it borders · ◇ the positions, mapped in Part III of the book · ○ the eras and comparison tables (Parts IV and V)
The full card is in the book
In The Coordinates of Thought this card goes on to a worked example that sets the answers against one case, and to where the question touches daily life — page 116.
On Coordinates of Thought
Conversations about this question in Truth:
- Truth as ‘what inquiry converges on’ breaks down exactly where we most need it: ethics 6 replies
- Did classical Chinese philosophers have a concept of truth, or only of the “admissible”? 6 replies
- Deflationism is right: “true” is a useful device, not the name of a property 6 replies
- Reading group: Tarski’s “The Semantic Conception of Truth” (1944) in three sittings 6 replies
- If many-sidedness is true only from a standpoint, then Jain anekāntavāda undermines itself 5 replies